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Abstract 
 
We explore a framework that could be used to assign quantitative allocations of 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), across all countries, one budget period at a time, 
as envisioned at the December 2011 negotiations in Durban.  Under the two-part plan: (i) 
China, India, and other developing countries accept targets at Business as Usual (BAU) 
in the coming budget period, the same period in which the US first agrees to cuts below 
BAU; and (ii) all countries are asked in the future to make further cuts in accordance with 
a common numerical formula to all.  The formula is expressed as the sum of a 
Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization 
Factor. This paper builds on our previous work in many ways. First we update targets to 
reflect pledges made by governments after the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009 
and confirmed at the Cancun meeting of December 2010. Second, the WITCH model, 
which we use to project economic and environmental effects of any given set of emission 
targets, has been refined and updated to reflect economic and technological 
developments.  We include the possibility of emissions reduction from bio energy (BE), 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), and avoided deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+) which is an important component of pledges in several developing countries.   
Third, we use a Nash criterion for evaluating whether a country‘s costs are too high to 
sustain cooperation. 
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Summary 
 
    In December 2011, the UNFCC Conference of Parties in Durban, South 
Africa,  chose 2015 as the deadline for negotiating a successor agreement to the 
Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change.   Crucially, major developing 
countries agreed for the first time to the principle of adopting the same sort of 
legally binding emission limits as advanced countries, to take effect in 2020. 
This study explores a possible agreement in the form of a framework of 
formulas that produce precise numerical targets for emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) and other greenhouse gases, in all regions of the world in all decades of this 
century.  The  formulas  are  based  on  pragmatic  judgments  about  what  kind  of 
cooperation is sustainable.  The reason for this approach is the authors‘ belief that 
many of the usual science-based, ethics-based, and economics-based paths are not 
viable in practice.  Successor governments will not be able politically to abide by 
the  commitments  that  today‘s  leaders  make  if  those  commitments  become 
excessively costly relative to a strategy of dropping out.    
If unraveling in a future decade is foreseeable at the time that long-run 
commitments are made, then those commitments will not be credible from the 
start.   Firms, consumers, and researchers base their current decisions to invest in 
plant and equipment, consumer durables, or new technological possibilities on the 
expected future price of carbon: If government commitments are not credible from 
the start, then they will not raise the expected future carbon price.  
Three political constraints seem inescapable if key countries are to join a 
new  treaty  and  abide  subsequently  by  their  commitments:  (1)  Developing 
countries are not asked to bear any cost in the early years.  (2) Thereafter, they are 
not asked to make any sacrifice that is different in kind or degree from what was 
made by those countries that went before them, with due allowance for differences   3 
in incomes.  (3) No country is asked to accept an ex ante target that costs it more 
than  Y%  of  income  in  present  discounted  value  (PDV),  or  more  than  X%  of 
income in any single budget period.  The logic is that no country will agree to ex 
ante targets that have very high costs, nor abide by them ex post.   We begin with 
thresholds of X=5.0 and Y=1.0. 
The proposed targets for emissions are formulated assuming the following 
framework.   Between now and 2050, the European Union follows the path laid 
out  in  the  2008  European  Commission  Directive;  the  United  States  and  other 
advanced  countries  follow  the  paths  specified  in  their  submissions  under  the 
Copenhagen Accord as recorded by the time of the Cancun Summit of December 
2010;  while  China,  India  and  other  developing  countries  agree  immediately  to 
quantitative  emission  targets,  which  in  the  first  decades  merely  copy  their 
business-as-usual (BAU) paths, thereby precluding leakage.  These countries are 
not initially expected to commit to emission targets below their BAU trajectory.   
When the time comes for developing countries to join mitigation efforts 
their  emission  targets  are  determined  using  a  formula  that  incorporates  three 
elements: a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a 
Gradual Equalization Factor.   These three factors are designed to persuade the 
joining  countries  that  they  are  only  being  asked  to  do  what  is  fair  in  light  of 
actions already taken by others, to follow in the footsteps of those who have gone 
before.   In the first years that a country‘s emission target is to decline below the 
BAU path, the Progressive Reductions Factor dominates.   The reductions asked of 
lower income countries are proportionately lower.   As time passes, the Latecomer 
Catch-up  Factor  becomes  more  important.    Countries  are  increasingly  pulled 
further from their BAU path and closer toward what their emissions were at the 
end of the 20
th century.    In the latter part of the 21
st century, the formula that 
determines  the  emissions  path  is  increasingly  dominated  by  the  Gradual 
Equalization Factor.   National targets gradually converge in per capita terms. The   4 
glue that holds the agreement together is that every country has reason to feel that 
it is only doing its fair share. 
 
We use the WITCH model to analyze the results of this approach in terms 
of projected paths for emissions targets, permit trading, the price of carbon, lost 
income,  and  environmental  effects.    Overall  economic  costs,  discounted  at  5 
percent,  average  0.6  percent  of  Gross  World  Product.    The  largest  discounted 
economic loss suffered by any country from the agreement overall is 1.0 percent 
of income.   The largest loss suffered by any country in any one period is less than 
5.0 percent of income.   Atmospheric CO2 concentrations level off at 500 parts per 
million (ppm) in the latter part of the century.    We also see if it is possible to 
attain  more  ambitious  environmental  goals  by  choosing  more  aggressive 
parameters for the formulas.   We manage to cap CO2 concentrations below 450 
ppm -- delivering a predicted temperature increase of about 2.3°C in 2100, not too 
far above the widely desired 2°C -- but only by means of an approximate doubling 
of economic costs.   
 
We do not take a position on what level of concentrations is low enough or 
what  level  of  economic  costs  is  too  high.    Our  claim  is  that,  whatever  the 
environmental goal, the chances that cooperation to achieve it will be sustainable 
are higher if all countries join an agreement and if it is credible that they will 
continue to comply.  These conditions, in turn, are more likely if each is given 
reason to feel it is being asked to do no more than its fair share, taking due account 
of  differences  in  income,  and  if  no  country  has  to  absorb  an  unusually  large 
economic loss in any given period.   5 
1.  Introduction   
Of all the obstacles that have impeded a global cooperative agreement to address 
the problem of Global Climate Change, perhaps the greatest has been the gulf between 
the advanced countries on the one hand, especially the United States, and the developing 
countries  on  the  other  hand,  especially  China  and  India.      As  long  ago  as  the 
―differentiated responsibilities‖ language of the Berlin Mandate of 1995 under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it was understood that 
developing countries would not be asked to commit legally to emissions reductions in the 
same time span that industrialized countries did.   But as long ago as the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution of 1997, it was understood that the U.S. Senate would not ratify any treaty 
that did not ask developing countries to take on meaningful commitments at the same 
time as the industrialized countries.   Sure enough, the United States did not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol that was negotiated later the same year.
1 
Each side has a valid point to make.   On the one hand, the U.S. reasoning is clear: 
it will not impose quantitative limits on its own GHG emissions if it fears that emissions 
from China, India, and other developing countries will continue to grow unabated.   Why, 
it asks, should American firms bear the economic cost of cutting emissions , if energy-
intensive activities such as aluminum smelters and steel mills would just migrate to 
countries that have no caps and therefore have cheaper energy  – the problem known as 
leakage – and global emissions would continue their rapid rise?     On the other hand, the 
leaders  of  India  and  China  are  just  as  clear:  they  are  unalterably  opposed  to  cutting 
                                                 
1 Nor did Australia.  Canada ratified, but eventually dropped out, faced with the extremely high 
economic cost it would have taken to achieve its emissions target.  The EU is expected to have 
met its target.   6 
emissions until after the United States and other rich countries have gone first.   After all, 
the  industrialized  countries  created  the  problem  of  global  climate  change,  while 
developing  countries  are  responsible  for  only  about  20  percent  of  the  CO2  that  has 
accumulated in the atmosphere from industrial activity over the past 150 years.  Limiting 
emissions,  they  argue,  would  hinder  the  efforts  of  poor  countries  at  economic 
development.   As India points out, Americans emit more than ten times as much carbon 
dioxide per person as it does. 
    In December 2011, the UNFCC Conference of Parties in Durban, South Africa,  
produced a new ray of hope for an agreement.  It chose 2015 as the deadline for 
negotiating a successor to the Kyoto Protocol to come into force by 2010.   Crucially, 
major developing countries agreed for the first time to the principle of legally binding 
emission limits. 
  What is needed is a specific framework for setting the actual emission targets that 
signers of a Kyoto-successor treaty can realistically be expected to adopt.
2  There is one 
practical solution to the apparently irreconcilable differe nces between the US and the 
developing countries regarding binding quantitative targets.  The United States would 
indeed agree to join Europe in adopting serious emission targets.     Simultaneously, in the 
same agreement, China, India, and other developing countries would agree to a path that 
immediately imposes on them binding emission targets as well—but targets that in the 
first period simply follow the so-called business-as-usual path.    BAU is defined as the 
                                                 
2  Technically the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements are not building a successor 
regime to the Kyoto Protocol, because they include quantitative commitments from developing 
countries whereas the Kyoto Protocol continues to exist and continues to apply only to so-called 
Annex I countries.   The sooner the two separate tracks are integrated, the better.   In this study, 
when we speak of a workable successor to Kyoto we are talking about a regime that includes 
developing countries.   7 
path of increasing emissions that these countries would experience in the absence of an 
international agreement, preferably as determined by experts‘ projections.  
  Of  course  an  environmental  solution  also  requires  that  China  and  other 
developing countries subsequently make cuts below their BAU path in future years, and 
eventually make cuts in absolute terms as well.  The sequence of negotiation can become 
easier over time, as everyone gains confidence in the framework.   But the developing 
countries can be asked to make cuts in the future that do not differ in nature from those 
made by Europe, the United States, and others who have gone before them, taking due 
account of differences in income.  Emission targets can be determined by formulas that: 
(i)  give  lower-income  countries  more  time  before  they  start  to  cut  emissions,  
(ii) lead to gradual convergence across countries of emissions per capita over the 
course of the century, and 
(iii) take care not to reward any country for joining the system late.    
 
  We  have  proposed  a  set  of  formulas  of  this  sort  in  past  research  and  have 
projected the possible economic environmental effects by means of the WITCH model.    
The  choice  of  parameters  in  Frankel  (2009)  allowed  the  world  to  achieve  global 
concentrations of 500 ppm CO2 in the year 2100, while the estimated economic costs 
obeyed two political constraints:  no single country or region is expected to bear a loss of 
more than 5% of income in any given period nor to bear a loss of more than 1% of 
income in terms of present discounted value.    The choice of parameters in Bosetti and 
Frankel (2012) was more aggressive, to attain somewhat ambitious environmental goals 
at higher economic costs.   8 
The present study revises and updates our exercise along a variety of dimensions.   
As  a  result  of  the  Copenhagen  Accord  and  Cancun  Agreements,  we  now  have 
undertakings from more than 80 countries, including numerical goals not just for the EU 
27  but  also  for  13  other  Annex  I  countries  (advanced  countries  plus  a  few  former 
members of the Soviet Bloc) and  –  most importantly  – for 7 big emerging markets:  
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea.    Thus we have 
a  firmer  numerical  basis  on  which  to  extrapolate  what  sorts  of  emission  targets  are 
politically reasonable.   
The WITCH model has been recalibrated to reproduce the most updated dataset 
for the economy and the technologies.  Ongoing revisions of the WITCH model have 
been necessary to take into account such economic developments as the 2008-09 global 
recession and such climate policy developments as the agreed or contemplated inclusion 
of other  gases,  forestation, biomass,  and carbon capture and storage.   India has  been 
broken out separately, so we now have twelve countries or regions instead of eleven.  
Other  refinements  to  the  WITCH  model  include  accounting  for  lost  income  for  oil 
producers  (which  works  to  raise  cost  estimates),  and  new  estimates  of  alternative 
technologies such as wind, bio energy, and CCS (which works to reduce cost estimates).
3   
The climate model has also been updated, with a better effort to account for aerosols.    
 In this study we adopt a criterion for measuring each country‘s economic costs 
that  better  suits  the  fundamental  Nash  theory  of  the  sustainability  of  cooperative 
agreements.  In the classic prisoner‘s dilemma, the two players are doomed to the Nash 
                                                 
3 Previously, the WITCH model had not treated wind power independently from solar energy, and 
there had been no allowance for intermittency.   Similarly, the possibility of CCS with gas is now 
included in all results.   BE with CCS, which refers to the technology of woody bio-mass with 
carbon capture and storage and has the potential for negative emissions, is included in some of 
our results, where it is explicitly identified.    9 
non-cooperative equilibrium if each calculates that he will be better off defecting from 
the  cooperative  equilibrium  even  if  the  other  does  not  defect.      But  the  cooperative 
equilibrium is sustainable if every participant figures that the benefits of continuing to 
cooperate outweigh the costs, taking the strategies of the others as given.   We will use 
the phrase ―Nash criterion‖ to describe the way of measuring economic costs to each 
country of participating in the agreement relative to an alternative strategy of dropping 
out while others stay in.  
Although the prospect of free riding works against the incentive to cooperate for 
most countries, our results suggest that the estimated economic cost of cooperation for 
those  few  regions  that  previously  appeared  to  be  at  the  greatest  risk  of  defection  is 
smaller than expected.   If one assumes that all countries face some (small) penalty for 
defecting, perhaps moral opprobrium or tariffs on carbon-intensive exports, then it might 
be possible to sustain a cooperative equilibrium. 
We also  continue to  explore the possibility of  more aggressive environmental 
targets in our projections.   The resulting estimated economic costs are high.  But since 
national leaders have officially agreed on a goal of limiting global warming to 2 degrees 
Celsius, the economist who wants to make himself or herself useful will see if there exist 
ways to achieve such goals that are more practical than other ways. 
 
 
2.  A Framework to Set Emissions Targets for All Countries and All 
Decades    10 
Virtually all the many existing proposals for a post-Kyoto agreement are based on 
scientific environmental objectives (e.g., stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 
380  ppm  in  2100),  ethical/philosophical  considerations  (e.g.,  the  principle  that  every 
individual on earth has equal emission rights), economic cost-benefit analyses (weighing 
the economic costs of abatement against the long-term environmental benefits), or some 
combination of these considerations.
4   This paper  studies a way to allocate emission 
targets for all countries, for the remainder of the century , that is intended to be more 
practical in that it is also based on political considerations, rather than on science , ethics 
or economics alone.
5 
 
Before Copenhagen 
At the 2007 UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Bali, governments agreed on a 
broad long-term  goal  of cutting total  global emissions  in  half by 2050.   At a  2009 
meeting in L‘Aquila, Italy, the G8 leaders agreed to an environmental goal of limiting the 
temperature  increase  to  2°C,  which  is  thought  to  correspond  roughly  to  a  GHG 
concentration level of 450 ppm (or approximately 380 ppm CO2 only).      
                                                 
4 Important examples of the science-based approach, the cost-benefit-based approach, and the 
rights-based approach, respectively, are Wigley (2007), Nordhaus (1994, 2008), and Baer et al. 
(2008). 
5 Chakravarty, et al (2009) and German Advisory Council on Global Change (2009) propose 
gradual  convergence  of  per  capita  targets.    Llavador,  Roemer  and  Silvestre  (2011)  propose 
convergence in welfare per capita.   Numerous others have offered their own thoughts on post-
Kyoto plans, at varying levels of detail, including Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz (2001); Aldy and 
Stavins (2008);  Barrett (2006); Barrett and Stavins (2003); Bierman, Pattberg, and Zelli (2010); 
Birdsall,  et  al  (2009);  Carraro  and  Egenhofer  (2003);    Kolstad  (2006);  Nordhaus  (2006); 
Olmstead  and  Stavins  (2006),  Seidman  and  Lewis  (2009)  and  Stern  (2007,  2011).  Aldy, 
Barrett, and Stavins (2003) and Victor (2004) review a number of existing proposals.  Aldy et al 
(2010) offers a more comprehensive survey.     11 
These meetings did not come close to producing agreement on who will cut how 
much in order to achieve the lofty stated goals.  Further, the same national leaders are 
unlikely still to be alive or in office when realistic multilateral targets to reach these goals 
would come due.  For this reason, the aggregate goals set out in these contexts cannot be 
viewed as anything more than aspirational.  
Industrialized  countries  did,  in  1997,  agree  to  national  quantitative  emissions 
targets  for the Kyoto  Protocol‘s first budget  period, so  in  some sense  we know that 
agreements on specific emissions restrictions are possible.  But nobody has ever come up 
with an enforcement mechanism that simultaneously imposes serious penalties for non-
compliance and is acceptable to member countries.  Given the importance countries place 
on national sovereignty it is unlikely that this will change.  Hopes must instead rest on 
relatively  weak  enforcement  mechanisms  such  as  the  power  of  moral  suasion  and 
international opprobrium or possibly trade penalties against imports of carbon-intensive 
products from non-participants.  It is safe to say that in the event of a clash between such 
weak enforcement mechanisms and the prospect of a large economic loss to a particular 
country, aversion to the latter would likely win out. 
 
A framework to last a century 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the plan studied here seeks to bring all countries into an 
international policy regime on a realistic basis and to look far into the future.   But we 
cannot pretend to see with as fine a degree of resolution at a century-long horizon as we 
can at a five- or ten-year horizon.  Fixing precise numerical targets a century ahead is 
impractical.  Rather, there will have to be a century-long sequence of negotiations, fitting   12 
within a common institutional framework that builds confidence as it goes along.   The 
framework  must  have  enough  continuity  so  that  success  in  the  early  phases  builds 
members‘  confidence  in  each  other‘s  compliance  commitments  and  in  the  fairness, 
viability, and credibility of the process.   Yet the framework must be flexible enough that 
it  can  accommodate  the  unpredictable  fluctuations  in  economic  growth,  technology 
development,  climate,  and  political  sentiment  that  will  inevitably  occur.      Only  by 
striking  the  right  balance  between  continuity  and  flexibility  can  a  framework  for 
addressing climate change hope to  last a century or more.   
 
 Political constraints 
We take five political constraints as axiomatic: 
1.  The United States will not commit to quantitative targets if China and other major 
developing countries do not commit to quantitative targets at the same time. (This 
leaves completely open the initial level and future path of the targets.)  Any plan will 
be found unacceptable if it leaves the less developed countries free to exploit their 
lack  of  GHG  regulation  for  ―competitive  advantage‖  at  the  expense  of  the 
participating countries‘ economies and leads to emissions leakage at the expense of 
the environmental goal.  
2.  China, India, and other developing countries will not make sacrifices they view as 
a.  fully contemporaneous with rich countries, 
b.  different in  character from those made by richer countries  who have gone 
before them, 
c.  preventing them from industrializing,   13 
d.  failing to recognize that richer countries should be prepared to make greater 
economic sacrifices than poor countries, or 
e.  failing to  recognize that the rich countries  have benefited from an ―unfair 
advantage‖ in being allowed to achieve levels of per capita emissions that are 
far above those of the poor countries. 
3.  In the short run, emission targets for developing countries must be computed relative 
to current levels or BAU paths; otherwise the economic costs will be too great for the 
countries  in  question  to  accept.  But  if  post-1990  increases  were  permanently 
―grandfathered,‖ then countries that have not yet agreed to cuts would have a strong 
incentive to ramp up emissions in the interval before they joined.  Countries cannot 
be rewarded for having ramped up emissions far above 1990 levels, the reference year 
agreed to at Rio and Kyoto. Of course there is nothing magic about 1990 but, for 
better or worse, it is the year on which Annex I countries have until now based their 
planning.
6 
4.  No country will accept a path of targets that is expected to cost it more than Y percent 
of income throughout the 21
st century (in present discounted value).  For now, we set  
Y at 1 percent. 
5.  No country will accept targets in any period that are expected to cost more than X 
percent of income to achieve during that period; alternatively, even if targets were 
                                                 
6  If the international consensus were to shift the base year from 1990 to 2005, our proposal 
would do the same.  Ten countries that accepted targets at Kyoto continued at Cancun to define 
their targets relative to 1990, including the EU (counted as one country).  Australia shifted to 
2000 as its point of reference, Canada and the US to 2005.  The latter three countries are 
reflecting the reality of current emission levels that are by now very far above their 1990 levels.  
But our Latecomer Catchup Factor fulfills the same function.   14 
already in place, no country would in the future actually abide by them if it found the 
cost to doing so would exceed X percent of income.  For now, we set X at 5 percent. 
 
Of the above propositions, even just the first and second alone seem to add up to a 
hopeless  stalemate:  Nothing  much  can  happen  without  the  United  States,  the  United 
States will not proceed unless China and other developing countries start at the same 
time, and China will not start until after the rich countries have gone first.   There is only 
one possible solution; only one knife-edge position satisfies the constraints.   At the same 
time that the United States agrees to binding emission cuts in the manner of Kyoto, China 
and other developing countries agree to a path that immediately imposes on them binding 
emission targets—but these targets in their early years simply follow the BAU path.    
In  later  decades,  the  formulas  we  consider  do  ask  substantially  more  of  the 
developing countries.  But these formulas also obey basic notions of fairness, by asking 
only for cuts that are analogous in magnitude to the cuts made by others who began 
abatement earlier and by making due allowance for developing countries‘ low per capita 
income  and  emissions  and  for  their  baseline  of  rapid  growth.      These  ideas  were 
developed in earlier papers
7 which suggested that the formulas used to develop emissions 
targets incorporate four or five variables: 1990 emissions, emissions in the year of the 
negotiation,  population,  and  income.    One  might  also  include  a  few  other  special 
variables such as whether the country in  question has coal or hydroelectric power  -- 
though the 1990 level of emissions conditional on per capita income can largely capture 
these special variables -- and perhaps a dummy variable for the transition economies. 
                                                 
7 Frankel (1999, 2005, 2007) and Aldy and Frankel (2004).  Some other authors have made 
similar proposals.   15 
 
We narrow down the broad family of possible formulas to a manageable set, by 
the  development  of  the  three  factors:  a  short-term  Progressive  Reductions  Factor,  a 
medium-term Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a long-run Gradual Equalization Factor.  
We then put them into operation to produce specific numerical targets for all countries, 
for all remaining five-year budget periods of the 21
st century.  Next, these targets are fed 
into  the  WITCH  model  to  see  the  economic  and  environmental  consequences.  
International trading plays an important role. The framework is flexible enough that one 
can  adjust  a  parameter  here  or  there—for  example  if  the  economic  cost  borne  by  a 
particular country is deemed too high or the environmental progress deemed too low—
without having to abandon the entire framework. 
 
Estimation of Business As Usual path 
One  must  acknowledge  that  BAU  paths  are  neither  easily  ascertained  nor 
immutable.    Countries  may  ―high-ball‖  their  BAU  estimates  in  order  to  get  more 
generous targets (though this may be difficult for those who have hitherto ―low-balled‖ 
their claimed emissions path to appear virtuous global citizens).  Even assuming that 
estimates are unbiased, important unforeseen economic and technological developments 
could occur between 2010 and 2020 that will shift the BAU trajectory for the 2020s, for 
example.   Any number of unpredictable events have already occurred in the years since 
1990.  They include German reunification, the 1997–1998 East Asia crisis, the boom in 
the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), the global financial crisis of 2008–  16 
2009, and great volatility in world oil prices over the last decade including the spikes of 
2008 and 2011.    
A first measure to deal with the practical difficulty of setting the BAU path is to 
specify in the Kyoto-successor treaty that estimates must be generated by an independent 
international expert body, not by national authorities.  A second measure, once the first 
has  been  assured,  is  to  provide  for  updates  of  the  BAU  paths  every  budget  period.  
Allowing  for  periodic  adjustments  to  the  BAU  baseline  does  risk  undermining  the 
incentive for carbon-saving investments, on the logic that such investments would reduce 
future BAU paths and thus reduce future target allocations.  This risk is the similar to the 
risk of encouraging countries to ramp up their emissions.  That is why we introduce a 
Latecomer  Catch-up  Factor  into  the  formula  which  rapidly  diminishes  the  weight 
assigned to BAU after a few budget periods and instead tethers countries to their 1990 
emission levels in the medium run. 
 
 
3. The Post-Copenhagen Submissions as Starting Points 
 
Countries are expected to agree to the second step, quantitative targets that entail 
specific cuts below BAU, at a time determined by their circumstances.  In our initial 
simulations, the choice of year for introducing an obligation actually to cut emissions was 
generally guided by two thresholds: when a country‘s average per capita income exceeds 
$3000 per year and/or when its per capita annual emissions approach 1 ton or more.       17 
But  we  found  that  starting  dates  had  to  be  further  modified  in  order  to  satisfy  our 
constraints regarding the distribution of economic losses. 
  As already noted, this approach assigns emission targets in a way that is more 
sensitive to political realities than other proposed target paths.  Specifically, numerical 
targets are based (a) on commitments that political leaders in various key countries have 
already proposed or adopted, as of December 2010, and (b) on formulas designed to 
assure latecomer countries that the emission cuts they are being asked to make represent 
no  more  than  their  fair  share  --  in  that  they  correspond  to  the  sacrifices  that  other 
countries before them have already made.    
 
The Cancun targets 
Table  1  summarizes  the  quantitative  targets  submitted  under  the  Copenhagen 
Accord  and  recognized  in  Cancun  in  December  2010.    Most  countries  defined  their 
targets relative to their 1990 emission levels (as was done in the Kyoto Protocol), some 
relative to a more recent base year (usually 2005) and some relative to BAU (a baseline 
that is more subject to interpretation).  When evaluating the Latecomer Catch-up Factor, 
we  will  want  to  express  targets  relative  to  1990.    When  evaluating  the  Progressive 
Reduction Factor, we express the targets relative to BAU as estimated by the WITCH 
model (not by the country itself), shown in the last two columns of the table.   For all 
non-OECD countries we assume that caps imposed before 2025 are no more stringent 
than BAU levels. Even though a few individual countries expressed readiness for caps 
that bind more sharply at Copenhagen and Cancun (e.g., Brazil‘s 2020 pledges), we do   18 
not feel that it would be appropriate to extend such commitments to the entire region in 
which such countries are located (e.g., Latin America). 
 
Targets for EU  
Brussels in 2008 committed unilaterally to reduce European Union emissions 20 
percent below 1990 levels by 2020.
8  But the European Union (EU) also said it would cut 
emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, conditional on other countries joining 
in. Thus, given assumptions on other countries‘ commitments, we now set an EU target 
of 30 percent below 1990 levels. EU targets continue their downward trajectory in the 
third period, 2020–2025, to 35 per cent below 1990 levels and then progress in equal 
increments to a level 50 percent below in the eighth period, 2045–2050. 
 
Target for Japan 
Japan‘s Copenhagen pledge for 2020 is 25 percent below 1990 levels, which is 29 
percent below 2005 levels.   This is the same as what he had assumed previously, based 
on prime ministers‘ statements. 
 
Target for US 
  The American submission under the Copenhagen Accord is 2020 emissions at 
17% below 2005 levels (which would represent the achievement of the Kyoto goal of 5% 
below 1990 levels, but delayed by an entire decade).   We had previously taken our cue 
from bills in the US Congress in assuming that emissions were targeted roughly to flatten 
                                                 
8 Documentation of pre-Copenhagen legislation or announcements by leaders in the EU and other 
national governments is given in the footnotes to the 2009 working paper version of Bosetti and 
Frankel (2012).   19 
between 2012 and 2020.  This is more aggressive than that with respect to the near term, 
which is consistent with the evidence n the meantime that American emissions peaked in 
2007, as a result of the ensuing recession.  The Congressional bills had been aggressive in 
the longer term, and we follow them in assuming a year-2050 target that is 83% below 
the 2005 level. 
 
Targets for Korea, South Africa and Australia 
  These three coal-dependent countries are grouped together.  We had previously 
assumed that the Korean target would show flat emissions from 2005 to 2020.  But Korea 
has  persisted  with  more  aggressive  targets:  its  Cancun  submission  for  2020,  though 
defined as 30 percent below BAU, translates to 18% below 2005 emissions.   Similarly 
with South Africa:  phrased as 34 percent below BAU, it translates to 23% below 2005.  
Australia is having great difficulty making up its mind.   Its targets could lie anywhere 
from 11% to 32% below 2005.   We take the South African target, 34 per cent below 
BAU, to represent the threesome. 
 
Targets for Latin America 
  Mexico, preparing for the Cancun meeting in December 2010, felt the usual host‘s 
obligation to make a significant offer.   Mexico and Brazil both suggested 2020 targets 
phrased relative to BAU.  Brazil‘s is the more aggressive, translating to 34 to 37 per cent 
below  2005  levels.    We  assume  that,  although  pledges  for  Brazil  are  stricter,  Latin 
America overall is not yet prepared to undertake any cuts below BAU.    We assume that   20 
the region is prepared to start cutting below BAU in 2040, or in 2025 when we turn to a 
more aggressive scenario.  
 
Targets for East Asia 
East Asia is a category that here excludes Japan, China and Korea; thus it is really 
Southeast  Asia.    Its  largest  member  is  Indonesia.    Indonesia‘s  Copenhagen  target, 
translated from BAU terms, is in the range 24 to 39 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020.  
But, again, we assume that the larger region is not yet prepared to be this aggressive.   
We continue to give BAU targets to the Southeast Asians until 2060, or until 2025 in the 
more ambitious case.  
 
Table 1:   Quantitative emission targets for 2020 submitted at Cancun under the 
Copenhagen Accord 
1990 2005 2020 1990 2005 2020 1990 2005 2020 LC HC LC HC LC HC LC HC
Australia -5%, -15% to -25% wrt 2000 0.42 0.53 0.62 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.48 0.37 11% -15% -11% -32% -23% -41%
Belarus  -5% / '-10% wrt 1990 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13 -6% -11% 56% 48% 29% 22%
Canada -17% wrt 2005 0.59 0.73 0.83 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.62 0.77 0.88 0.65 0.65 6% 6% -16% -16% -26% -26%
Croatia -5% wrt 1990 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 -5% -5% -2% -2% -20% -20%
Euro 27 -20% / -30% wrt 1990 5.57 5.12 6.13 0.02 0.01 0.02 5.59 5.13 6.15 4.47 3.91 -20% -30% -13% -24% -27% -36%
Iceland -30% wrt 1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -30% -30% -36% -36% -44% -44%
Japan -25% wrt 1990 1.27 1.35 1.54 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.29 1.38 1.57 0.98 0.98 -24% -24% -29% -29% -38% -38%
Kazakhstan -15% wrt 1992 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.31 -16% -16% 29% 29% 18% 18%
New Zealand -10% to -20% wrt 1990 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 -9% -19% -28% -36% -37% -44%
Norway -30% / -40% wrt 1990 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 -32% -42% -36% -46% -44% -52%
Russian Federation  -15% / -25% wrt 1990 3.32 2.12 2.31 0.06 0.04 0.01 3.38 2.16 2.32 2.83 2.50 -16% -26% 31% 16% 22% 8%
Switzerland -20% / -30% wrt 1990 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 -23% -32% -22% -31% -32% -40%
Turkey BaU 0.19 0.33 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.40 115% 115% 22% 22% -- --
Ukraine -20% wrt 1990 0.93 0.42 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.42 0.52 0.74 0.74 -20% -20% 75% 75% 44% 44%
United States -17% wrt 2005 6.11 7.10 8.23 0.07 0.03 0.00 6.18 7.13 8.23 5.90 5.90 -5% -5% -17% -17% -28% -28%
Brazil -0.97 / -1.05 GtCO2-eq wrt BaU 0.72 1.11 1.53 0.89 1.45 1.13 1.61 2.56 2.66 1.68 1.61 4% 0% -34% -37% -37% -40%
China reduce carbon intensity of output by 40-45% wrt 2005 3.72 7.61 10.75 0.04 0.03 -0.28 3.76 7.64 10.47 10.47 10.47 179% 179% 37% 37% -- --
India reduce carbon intensity of output by 20-25% wrt 2005 1.33 2.05 2.59 0.05 0.04 0.01 1.38 2.09 2.60 2.60 2.60 89% 89% 24% 24% -- --
Indonesia -26% / -41% wrt BaU 0.45 0.73 1.13 0.41 0.84 0.49 0.86 1.57 1.62 1.20 0.96 40% 12% -24% -39% -26% -41%
Mexico -51 Mt CO2-eq / -30% wrt BaU 0.45 0.61 0.84 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.48 0.65 0.87 0.82 0.61 71% 27% 26% -6% -6% -30%
South Africa -34% wrt BaU 0.34 0.44 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.44 0.51 0.34 0.34 -2% -2% -23% -23% -34% -34%
South Korea  -30% wrt BaU 0.30 0.67 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.67 0.79 0.55 0.55 84% 84% -18% -18% -30% -30%
wrt 2005 (%) wrt BaU (%)
Country Pledge at COP15
Copenhagen Pledges Greenhouse Gases Emissions (GT CO2-eq)
Target LULUCF Total Excluding LULUCF wrt 1990 (%)
 
 
Source: Calculations based on Business as Usual (BaU) scenarios of the WITCH model prepared for the The Emission Gap Report, 
United Nations Environment Program; adjustments were made when countries are not individually represented in the WITCH model .  
 
Targets for China and India 
In important breakthroughs, China and India announced targets after Copenhagen.  
They expressed the targets in terms of intensity (carbon emissions divided by GDP).  We,   21 
as  others,  estimate  that  these  targets  translate  approximately  into  these  countries‘ 
respective BAU paths. Environmentalists and American business interests may complain 
that these important countries do not propose to cut emissions below what they would be 
in the absence of an international agreement.  But this has been our plan all along for 
China and India in the near term.  The important thing is to cap their emissions and get 
them in the trading system.  Targets below BAU come later. 
Environmentalists and businessmen may come to realize that the commitment, 
even though only a commitment to BAU targets, is more important than it sounds.  It 
precludes the carbon leakage which, absent such an agreement, would undermine the 
environmental goal, and it ameliorates the competitiveness concerns of carbon-intensive 
industries in rich countries.  A commitment to BAU targets would provide assurance that 
developing countries will not exploit the opportunity to go above their BAU paths, as 
they might in the absence of this commitment.     
Our approach recognizes that it would be politically difficult to get China to agree 
to substantial actual cuts in the short term.   Indeed China might well continue to register 
strong objections to being asked to take on legally binding targets of any kind at the same 
time as the United States.   But the Chinese may be coming to realize that they would 
actually gain from such an agreement, by acquiring the ability to sell emission permits at 
the same world market price as developed countries.  (China currently receives lower 
prices for lower-quality project credits under the Kyoto Protocol‘s Clean Development 
Mechanism.)    
How do we know they would come out  ahead?   China is currently  building 
roughly 100 power plants per year, to accommodate its rapidly growing demand.   In the   22 
absence of environmental policy, most would continue to run on cheap coal.   The cost of 
shutting down an already-functioning coal-fired power plant in the United States is far 
higher than the cost of building a new clean low-carbon plant in China in place of what 
otherwise might be a new dirty coal-fired plant.  Because of this gap in costs, when an 
American firm pays China to cut its emissions voluntarily, thereby obtaining a permit that 
the American firm can use to meet its emission obligations, both parties benefit in strictly 
economic terms.     
 
Targets for former Soviet republics 
Four  countries  report  emission  targets  that  actually  work  out  to  constitute 
increases above their BAU paths. These are not developing countries, but rather countries 
that were once part of the Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.   Their 
proposed cuts appear as the four points below the zero axis in Figure 1a.  In the case of 
Ukraine, the proposed target is a full 44% above its current BAU.    This is because the 
targets keyed to 1990 for these countries were rendered obsolete, based on the judgment 
that their economies had collapsed following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  These 
countries are seeking a continuation of the ―hot air‖ that they received under the Kyoto 
Protocol.   
One sometimes hears claims that the hot air for these countries agreed at Kyoto 
was inadvertent.   After all, it created the potential for them to sell permits and thus get 
paid  for  emission  reductions  that  had  already  occurred  for  reasons  unrelated  to  the 
environment.    This concession was in fact not inadvertent, but was judged by other 
delegations to be necessary to induce the former Soviet countries to agree to the Kyoto   23 
Protocol.   (An additional factor in this calculation was that Russia arguably has much 
less of a stake in avoiding global warming than do most other countries.)  The fact that 
other delegations judged this concession warranted in 1997 does not necessarily mean 
that an extension of it is warranted again today.   
We will consider two cases, one where the targets for the four former Soviet 
countries  are  set  equal  to  BAU  (as  estimated  by  us,  not  the  countries  themselves), 
similarly  to  the  lower-income  countries,  and  another  where  they  are  given  the  extra 
benefits implicit in their Cancun submissions.
9    
 
“Fair” emission targets 
               Economists usually try to avoid the word ―fair,‖ since it means very different 
things to different people.  In the context of climate change policy, ―fair‖ to industrialized 
countries implies that they shouldn‘t have to cut carbon emissions if the emission-
producing industries are just going to relocate to developing countries that are not 
covered by the targets.   Our plan addresses this concern by assigning targets to all 
countries, rich and poor, even if in some cases they are only BAU targets.  ―Fair‖ to 
developing countries means that they shouldn‘t have to pay economic costs that are 
different in nature than those paid by industrialized countries before them, taking into 
account differences in income.   Our plan addresses this concern by including in the 
formula the Progressive Reductions Factor, which in the early years assigns to richer 
                                                 
9 The first draft of the paper presented the first case, i.e., no hot air.  When it comes to computing the 
economic costs of emission targets for the more stringent policy we investigate here, we find that the 
Transition Economies incur high costs unless they are given the early hot air or some other benefit to ease 
the burden, so we allow let them keep their hot air in the more stringent policy scenario. (Their costs are 
almost as high as for the MENA countries, and for the same reason: according to the new version of the 
WITCH model, oil producers pay a heavy price for the climate change regime.)   24 
countries targets that cut more aggressively relative to BAU, as well as the Gradual 
Equalization Factor, which dictates that in the long run all countries converge in the 
direction of equal emission rights per capita.   
 
Estimating the degree of progressivity 
Our  first  statistical  exercise  is  to  run  a  regression  of  the  cuts  implied  by  the 
Copenhagen-Cancun targets against the countries‘ current income per capita.  We expect 
to find a positive statistical relationship between income per capita and the emission cuts, 
under  the  hypothesis  that  it  is  reasonable  from  a  political  economy  viewpoint  for  
countries to make deeper percentage cuts relative to BAU the richer they are.  This is the 
progressive relationship that was uncovered in the Kyoto targets (Frankel, 1999, 2009):  
The targets agreed among Annex I countries at Kyoto in 1997, including among members 
of the EU considered separately, implied an estimated progressivity parameter of 0.14.  
Running the regression on the Copenhagen-Cancun numbers could be viewed either as an 
exercise  in  hypothesis-testing  or  as  an  exercise  in  parameter  estimation.      If  our 
hypothesis -- that it is reasonable as a matter of political economy to expect countries in 
their first year of emission cuts to accept larger cuts relative to BAU the higher their 
income -- is correct, then this progressive pattern should again show up in the numbers 
recorded under the Cancun Agreements.  Alternatively, we could use the regression to 
obtain a new estimate of the progressivity parameter.   25 
 
Figure 1a: Estimated progressivity in Cancun targets, including former Soviet countries 
 
Sources: WITCH model Projections 
 
Figure  1b:  Estimated  progressivity  in  Cancun  targets,  setting  former  Soviet  country 
targets to BAU 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
500 5000 50000
E
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
2
0
2
0
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
B
A
U
GDP per capita
y = 0.13
t = 3.9
R2 = .44
 
Sources: WITCH model Projections   26 
 
In Table 2a we regress emission cuts  (from BAU) against income  per capita, 
including all the Cancun targets, corresponding to Figure 1a.  Progressivity is highly 
significant:  the t-statistic is 3.7 and the R
2 is .42.   The estimated parameter is .16.     
When we eliminate excess over BAU in the emission targets for the four former Soviet 
countries as illustrated in Figure 1b, the results are even more highly significant. The t-
statistic is 3.9 and the R
2 is .44.  The estimated parameter is .13.  This is an encouraging 
result.    The  estimated  progressivity  parameter  is  not  just  statistically  significant,  but 
extraordinarily close to the estimate on a very different set of numbers determined 13 
years earlier, at the time of the Kyoto Protocol.    The current estimates, .13 and .16, 
bracket the earlier estimate, .14.    We are happy with this bit of external validation of the 
theory.  We see no need to update the estimate of the progressivity parameter γ used in 
the model, since the new estimates lie so close to the old one. 
 
Table 2a: Estimation of Progressivity  
Cancun emission target cuts, expressed relative to BAU, 
regressed against income per capita 
(21 country observations, counting EU27 as one) 
  Countries submitting negative cuts relative to BAU are: 
  taken at face value  set = 0 
  Intercept  γ    Intercept  γ 
Coefficient estimate  0.018  -0.162    0.008  -0.130 
Standard error  0.065  0.043    0.050  0.034 
t-statistic  0.07  -3.72    0.16  -3.87 
P value  0.789  0.001    0.878  0.001   27 
R
2  0.421    0.441 
 
   
Next  we  use  the  Copenhagen-Cancun  submissions  to  estimate  the  parameters  for 
latecomer catch-up at the same time as the progressivity parameter, in Table 2b.   
 
LnTarget 2020 =  
c  –  γ (ln income/cap) + (1-β) (lnBAU 2020) + β [(λ)(ln emissions1990) + (1-λ)(ln emissions2007)]     (1) 
where 
γ ≡  progressivity 
(1-β)  ≡  weight on BAU 
λ  ≡  strength of latecomers‘ catch-up. 
We estimate the formula shown in equation (1) by running the regression: 
(LnTarget 2020 - lnBAU2020 ) =   
c  – γ (ln income/cap) + β (ln emissions2007 -lnBAU2020) – βλ (ln emissions2007 -ln emission1990)         (2) 
 
Table 2b: Estimation of progressivity and latecomer catch-up factors 
 
Dependent variable: 
(lnTarget 2020 – lnBAU 2020 ) 
Coef.  Std. 
Err. 
t  P>t  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
             
ln income per capita  -0.156  0.031  -5.07  0  -0.22  -0.09 
ln emissions2007 -lnBAU2020  0.376  0.100  3.76  0.002  0.16  0.59 
ln emissions2007 - ln emissions1990    -0.328  0.091  -3.58  0.002  -0.52  -0.13 
Constant term  1.384  0.300  4.62  0  0.75  2.02 
. 
Source  SS       df   
Number of 
observations          21 
        F ( 3,   17)        13.02 
Model  1.092  3  Prob > F  0.0001 
Residual  0.475  17  R2  0.697 
      Adj R2  0.643   28 
Total  1.567  20  Root MSE  0.167 
 
  All three coefficients come out showing the hypothesized sign and high statistical 
significance.  This looks like further evidence in favor of our political economy theory.   
Indeed, one could hardly have wished for a stronger outcome of the hypothesis test.    
The point estimates of the coefficients are c=1.384,   = 0.156, β = 0.376, and βλ = 0.328.   
The progressivity parameter is still very close to its preceding value   γ =0.16,  even 
though we are now controlling for other factors.  Take the ratio of the last two 
coefficients to get the estimate λ  = 0.872.  We will use these estimates to update the 
parameters in our formulas. 
 
 
4.  Constructing the formula and parameters 
 
Our approach is to assume that countries determine whether to join the climate 
change  regime  and  to  abide  by  any  agreement  by  balancing  the  costs  and  benefits, 
broadly interpreted.  The benefits to a given country from participating are not modeled.  
But they include country‘s contribution to mitigating global climate change itself (which 
is not important for small countries), auxiliary benefits such as the environmental and 
health  effects  of  reducing  local  air  pollution,  the  avoidance  of  international  moral 
opprobrium, and perhaps the avoidance of trade penalties against non-participants.   
 
Constraints on economic costs   29 
The costs of participating are economic.  The benefits that some countries get 
from the right to sell emission permits are explicitly counted within (net) economic costs. 
 As  noted,  we  capture  the  cost-benefit  calculation  by  interpreting  political 
constraints as precluding that a country agrees to participate if the targets would impose 
an economic cost greater than Y% of income in terms of present discounted value.   In 
other words, Y can be interpreted as the sum of the benefits of participation.  If costs 
exceed benefits, the country will defect.  We further assume that political constraints 
preclude that a country will continue to comply with an agreement if the targets would 
impose a cost in any one period greater than X% of income.  In Frankel (2009), X was set 
at 5% of income, and Y at 1%.   Bosetti and Frankel (2012) allowed looser constraints. 
  What  is  the  benchmark  to  which  each  country  compares  participation  when 
evaluating its economic costs?  In our previous work, we assumed that the alternative to 
participation is BAU: what the world would look like if there had never been a serious 
climate change agreement in the first place.   This may indeed be the relevant benchmark, 
especially when the X threshold for the present discounted value of cost is interpreted as 
determining whether countries agree to the treaty ex ante, each conditional on the others 
agreeing.   Treaties like the Kyoto Protocol do not go into effect unless a particular high 
percentage of parties ratify the treaty.   There was room for no more than one large 
holdout.    
In the context of the Nash criterion, however, one could argue that cooperation is 
unlikely to be sustained when each individual country calculates that if it were to defect 
from the agreement on its own, with others continuing to abide by the agreement, the 
benefits of defecting would outweigh the benefits of participation.  It is not enough to   30 
calculate that bringing down the entire global agreement would inflict high costs.  The 
concern is that individual temptations to free-ride will torpedo cooperation, even though 
cooperation is in the collective interest. 
  Therefore we introduce here a new interpretation of the political constraint.  Each 
country  calculates  the  economic  benefit  of  dropping  out  of  an  agreement  under  the 
assumption that the rest continue to participate, which we call the Nash criterion for 
evaluating the economic cost of participating.  If that economic benefit exceeds X% of 
GDP in any given year, the country will drop out.   In that case – perhaps – the entire 
agreement will unravel, as other countries make similar calculations.  If this weakness is 
perceived from the beginning, then the agreement will never achieve credibility in the 
first place.
10   
The Nash criterion may sound like a more difficult test to meet than th e earlier 
one.  If one adds the gains from free-riding to the costs of compliance with an agreement, 
then it sounds less likely that we will find 500 ppm or any other given environmental 
target  to  satisfy  the  constraint  that  economic  costs  remain  under the   threshold  for 
sustainable cooperation. But that would be to view the question solely from the viewpoint 
of the many countries for whom a viable international climate regime is a good thing.   
From the viewpoint of most oil producers, any international cli mate regime reduces the 
demand for fossil fuels and so probably leaves them worse off.  Free riding on others‘ 
efforts is not a meaningful concept in their case. For the oil producers, therefore, defining 
the benchmark as the case where they drop out alone but the rest of the world stays in 
produces lower estimated costs to abiding by the agreement. The global oil price is going 
                                                 
10 Among those emphasizing the ―time inconsistency‖ of leaders‘ promises to cut emissions in the future 
are Helm et al (2003).   31 
to go down regardless.  This could make the cost-benefit test easier to meet than under 
the earlier criterion.
11 
   
MENA shows up with far higher costs than was true in our earlier research.   The 
reason is that many countries in the Middle East and North Africa are oil exporters, and 
the current version of the WITCH model pays more attention to the economic costs 
imposed on oil producers from a decline in world demand for fossil fuels. We presume 
these cost estimates to be well-founded; therefore to get them down we now grant MENA 
a later starting date.  The same is true to an extent of costs estimated for the Transition 
Economies and  Canada.  When pursuing the more ambitious environmental goal, in 
Section 7, we let the TE countries keep the hot air that is implicit in their Cancun 
submissions, in order to bring down their costs.  Among the countries not considered oil 
producers, the category that includes Korea, South Africa and Australia generally shows 
the highest  costs, especially toward the end of the century.   This turns out to be 
attributable to an assumption of the model that these countries include deposits of 
―unconventional oil‖ that become profitable later in the century, but that is penalized by a 
climate change regime along with the conventional oil producers. We are not convinced 
that the potential for these ―oil grades 7 and 8‖ is necessarily well-founded and so we 
have chosen to emphasize in our simulations a version of the model that omits them, with 
the result that costs are not so high for Korea, South Africa and Australia. 
 
                                                 
11 The test of sustainability becomes easier to satisfy if the oil exporters are the ones who are otherwise in 
most danger of violating the X and Y thresholds.  This in fact turns out to be the case in our estimates. (The 
test would become harder to satisfy if the other countries, those that want a climate change regime to work, 
are the ones who are most in danger of violating the X and Y thresholds.)   32 
Choice of parameters 
  We perform our analysis with values for λ and other parameters based on the 
econometric estimation of the equation parameters from the Copenhagen-Cancun 
submissions (i.e., the coefficients estimated in Table 2a).   We round off to λ = 0.9 the 
estimate from Table 2a for the latecomer catch-up factor in the first budget period during 
which a country accepts targets below BAU.     
We have all along intended that the latecomer catch-up process would be 
complete within a few decades, in other words that the partial accommodation accorded 
to countries that have ramped up their emissions between 1997 and 2012 would not be 
long-lasting.   Thus where we extend the analysis to modify parameter values in light of 
the Copenhagen-Cancun submissions, we will set in the second period of cuts for 
any given country (call it year τ), so that the equation in that case becomes: 
.  
(LnTarget τ - lnBAU τ ) = c  –  γ (income/cap) +  β (lnBAU τ  -ln emissions1990)    (2a) 
 
In words, the level of emissions in 2007 drops out of the equation as early as the second 
period of cuts for any given country.  The formula for the target in this case becomes a 
weighted average of BAU and 1990 (minus the usual Progressive Reduction Factor). We 
can round off to 0.4 the parameter β  (which is now the weight placed on 1990 emissions, 
versus BAU).  Needless to say, spurious precision in these parameter choices would not 
be appropriate. 
 
  The third component of the formula is the Gradual Equalization Factor (GEF).   
Beginning in 2050 we switch to a formula that in each period sets assigned amounts in   33 
per capita terms, as follows:  a weighted average of the country‘s most recent assigned 
amount and the global average, with a weight of  δ on the latter.   In past work we set  
δ=0.1, so that the speed of convergence across countries was 1/10 per five-year budget 
period.     In Section 5 here, when the environmental goal is year-2100 concentrations of 
CO2 equal to 500 ppm, we set the constant term c = 0.8
12 and δ = 0.11.  When we turn to 
a more stringent environmental goal, we adjust the constant term down to c = 0.3 for all 
countries and the GEF weight back down to δ = 0.10. 
 
 
 
 
5. The numerical emission target paths that follow from the formulas  
Table 2 reports the emissions targets produced by the formulas for each of twelve 
geographical regions, for every period between now and the end of the century.   
The twelve regions are:  
EU   =  Western Europe and Eastern Europe   EASIA = Smaller countries of East Asia     
US  =  United States        KOSAU = Korea, South Africa, and Australia 
CAJAZ = Canada, Japan, and New Zealand   TE = Russia and other Transition Economies 
MENA = Middle East and North Africa    SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
INDIA= India              SASIA= rest of South Asia  
CHINA = PRC          LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 
                                                 
12 We make an exception to our general practice of applying a uniform formula to all:  we give the TE 
group a constant term of 0.5 rather than 0.8 (to allow for the special circumstances of their obsoletely high 
emissions in 1990).   34 
 
Table 3: Target starting points for the 12 modeled regions (the case of 500 ppm goal) 
 
   2020  2050 
EU  30% below 1990 emissions  progress to 50% below 1990  
USA  17% below 2005  83% below 2005 
Australia, S.Africa & S.Korea  34% below baseline  50% below baseline 
Japan, Canada & NZ   25% below 1990  as before 
TE  BAU  Cap based on formula in 2055 
LAM  BAU  Cap based on formula in 2040 
India  BAU  BAU (cap based on formula, from 2060) 
EASIA  BAU  BAU (cap based on formula, from 2060) 
SASIA  BAU  BAU 
CHINA  BAU  Cap based on formula in 2050 
SSA  BAU  BAU 
MENA  BAU  Cap based on formula in 2065 
 
 
Figure 2: Global emission targets resulting from the formula, 500 ppm goal 
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Starting at the most highly aggregated level, Figure 2 shows global emissions.   
The path is a bit more aggressive than in previous work, as a reflection of the pledges 
made at Cancun.  The emissions peak comes in 2045.
13   Cuts steepen after 2050, so that 
energy-related emissions worldwide fall from over 40 Gigatons (Gt) of CO2 in 2040 to 
20 in 2100, ¼ their BAU level. 
 
How important is it that all countries/regions participate?   If one country drops 
out and others respond by doing the same, so that the result is to unrav el the entire 
agreement, then obviously the effect is very large.  But what if just one country or region 
drops out, or fails to sign up in the first place?  Figure 3 examines this question.   The 
bottom path represents full cooperation, the same as in Fig ure 2:  all countries sign up 
and continue to participate throughout the century.  If South Asia alone refuses to play, 
the result is the next-lowest path; it hardly makes any difference for global emissions as 
these economies are small.  If Canada, Japan and New Zealand are the only ones to drop 
out, the effect is just a bit more.   And so on.    The uppermost path shows what happens 
if China alone drops out.  It represents a big jump over the second highest path (the case 
where India alone drops out), or  the third highest (where the USA alone drops out).    
This illustrates that Chinese participation is the sine qua non of a successful global effort 
to address climate change, followed in importance by the participation of India and the 
United States.  It is more than noteworthy that these three big countries did not accept 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
14        
                                                 
13 Remarkably, this happens to correspond to the cost-efficient path found by  
Manne and Richels (1996, 1997), wherein global emissions peak in 2040-2050. 
14 In each of the ―Nash‖ simulations, where one country drops out at a time, it turns out that the 
free riding country emits less than it would in the BAU baseline.  According to the WITCH   36 
Figure 3: Global emissions if one drops out, but cooperation otherwise continues 
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Figure 4a: Targets and emissions by OECD countries under the 500 ppm goal 
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model, they take the opportunity from the cost improvements in the carbon free technologies 
among those countries that continue to participate and this outweighs the conventional leakage 
effects (according to which they consume more fossil fuels because the world price is reduced 
and they expand production in energy-intensive sectors because they gain a competitive 
advantage).   37 
 
Next we disaggregate between industrialized countries and developing countries.     
Figure 4a shows the former, defined now as members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Annex I countries excluding TE).  Emissions begin to 
decline as early as 2010, reflecting a real-world peaking of emissions around 2007 and 
recalibration  of  baselines  caused  in  large  part  by  the  global  recession  that  reduced 
industrial country activity sharply in 2009.
15   (Targets go on to decline from about 13 Gt 
of CO2 in 2010 to less than 3 Gt of CO2 in 2100. ) 
The  graph  also  shows  the  simulated  value  for  actual  emissions   of  the  rich 
countries, which decline more gradually than the  targets through mid-century because 
carbon permits are purchased on the world market, as is economically efficient.   The 
total value of the permit purchases runs about 6 Gt of CO2 in the middle decades of the 
century and then declines. 
Figure 4b shows that among non-OECD countries overall, both emissions targets 
and actual emissions peak in 2045.   The simulated path of actual emissions lies a little 
above the target caps.  The difference, again, is the value of permits sold by the poor 
countries to the rich countries.  Thanks to emission permit sales, actual emissions f all 
below the BAU path, though still rising well before developing countries are forced to cut 
by more aggressive targets after 2045. The total falls from the peak of about 38 Gt of 
energy-related CO2 emissions in 2045 to less than half that in 2100.    The year-2100 
emissions are about one third of the BAU level for that year. 
                                                 
15 That the peaking of rich-country emissions is attributable to the 2009 recession is consistent with the 
failure of most models to predict it (absent strong climate change policy).    In Frankel (2009), emissions 
did not begin to fall until 2025.  Even in the more aggressive policy scenario of Bosetti and Frankel (2012), 
they only peaked in 2010 and began to fall in 2015.     38 
Figure 4b: Targets and emissions by developing countries under the 500 ppm goal 
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  Other things equal, it is desirable that the rich countries not achieve too large a 
share of emission reductions in the form of permit purchases.    The estimates for the size 
of  the  international  market  in  carbon  emission  permits  are  presented  in  Appendix  2 
(Figures  21a  and  21b  for  the  500  ppm  goal  and  Figures  22a  and  22b  for  the  more 
ambitious environmental goal.) 
 
Figure 5:  Per capita emission targets under the 500ppm goal 
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The bar chart in Figure 5 expresses emissions in per capita terms, for every region 
in  every budget  period.   The United States,  even more than other rich countries,  is 
currently conspicuous by virtue of its high per capita emissions: close to 5 tons CO2 per 
capita.  But they start to come down after 2015, like the other rich regions. Emissions in 
developing  countries  continue  to  rise  for  a  bit  longer,  and  then  come  down  more 
gradually.  But their emissions per capita numbers of course start from a much lower 
base.      China  peaks  at  almost  3  tons  CO2  per  capita  in  2040.  Most  of  the  other 
developing countries rarely get above 1 ton CO2 per capita; India climbs just over 1 ton 
per  capita  briefly  at  the  peak  in  2060.    In  the  second  half  of  the  century,  everyone 
converges toward levels below one ton per capita, thanks to the gradual equalization 
formula. 
 
 
6.  Consequences of the targets, according to the WITCH model  
  We run these emission levels through the WITCH model to see the effects.  
Before we turn to the costs in terms of lost income, which is the measure of economic 
welfare that is relevant to economists, we look first at the effect on the price of energy, 
which is politically salient and also a good indicator of the magnitude of the intervention. 
 
Economic effects   
Figure 6 reports that the price of carbon remains quite reasonable through 2045, but 
then begins to climb steeply.    By 2100 it surpasses $250 per ton of CO2.    Many in the 
business world would consider this a high price.  The effect translates into an increase in   40 
the price for US gasoline around $2.5 per gallon.  Needless to say, this idea would be 
extremely unpopular, although the increment is on the same order of magnitude as petrol 
taxes today in Europe and Japan. 
16 
Figure 6:  Effect on energy prices, under 500 ppm goal 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Carbon Price per ton CO2 
(LHS axis)
$ per gallon motor 
gasoline (RHS axis)
 
 
  Global economic losses measured in terms of national income are illustrated in 
Figure 7a, for the case where bio energy with CCS is excluded.   Cost rises gradually 
over time up to 2085.  Given a positive rate of time discount, this is a good outcome.
17  
As late as 2050 they remain below 1% of income.   In the latter part of the century losses 
rise but never exceed 3% of income.    Figure 7b illustrates the case that allows for bio 
energy with CCS.  Now global costs stay below 2.1 per cent of income even late in the 
century.   Either way, the present discounted value of global costs is less than 0.7 per cent 
of income, using a discount rate of 5%. 
                                                 
16 The prices for carbon and gasoline here are substantially less than the prices estimated in Frankel (2009), 
let alone Bosetti and Frankel (2012).   The explanation is partly the greater attention paid to wind and to gas 
plus CCS, but mainly because of BE with CCS. The lower number of carbon-free alternatives, the larger 
role for energy saving.  The implication is a higher price of carbon but also lower amounts of carbon in the 
economy.  
17 Tol (1998).   41   42 
Figure 7a:  Global economic costs (% of income) of 500 ppm goal (without BE & CCS) 
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Figure 7b:  Global economic costs (% of income) of 500 ppm goal (with BE & CCS) 
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  Figures 8a and 8b report the economic costs country by country, for the first and 
 
second halves of the century, respectively.    
 
Figure 8a:  
Economic losses (% of income) of each region, under 500 ppm goal, 2010-2045 
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Figure 8b: Economic losses, 2050-2090 
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  Until 2050, costs remain below 1.2% of income for every country or region.  In 
the second half of the century they rise, for the Annex I countries of Kyoto in particular.    
But for every country and in every budget period the cost remains under 5% per cent of 
income.  This is good news:  it is the (admittedly arbitrary) threshold that we have used 
from the beginning, under the logic that no government could afford politically to 
continue to abide by an agreement that was costing the country more than 5 per cent of 
income.   It would make no difference if such a country had benefited from permit sales 
in the early years or even suffered no loss at all in present discounted value;  large 
potential losses in later years would render any earlier commitments ―dynamically 
inconsistent.‖ 
  Our other political constraint is that no government will sign its country up for an 
agreement that in ex ante terms is expected to cost more than a particular threshold, 
which Frankel (2009) – again arbitrarily – set at 1 per cent of income.  Table 4 reports the 
present discounted value of economic losses for each country or region, using a discount 
rate of 5 per cent.  In Table 4a the question is how much it costs the country in question 
to participate if the alternative is the case where there never was an operational 
international climate policy in the first place, in other words BAU.   The range of 
economic burdens across countries is wide.  It is close to zero for India and other poor 
countries.
18  But it is as high as 2.2 percent of income for the Middle East and North 
Africa, well above our desired threshold, and 1.2 percent for the Transition Economies.
19   
It lies in between for the United States, at 0.6 percent of income. 
                                                 
18  Pakistan and other non-India countries in South Asia actually gain, from the ability to sell permits, as 
does Sub-Saharan Africa.    
19 The cost estimates for the two regions are higher than in past research, because the WITCH model has 
been revised to capture the losses to oil producing countries from a reduced global demand for fossil fuels.   45 
Table 4: Present discounted value of cost region by region (as percent of income)  
 
4a:  Measured relative to alternative baseline of no international policy  
(i.e., BAU criterion) 
 
USA  EU  KoSAu  CaJaZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SAsia  China  EAsia  LAm  India 
0.6%  0.2%  0.7%  0.7%  1.2%  2.2%  -0.1%  -0.2%  1.1%  0.1%  0.5%  0.4% 
 
4b:  Measured relative to the alternative of unilateral dropping out  
while others continue to cooperate (i.e., Nash criterion) 
 
USA  EU  KoSAu  CaJaZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SAsia  China  EAsia  LAm  India 
0.7%  0.3%  0.8%  0.6%  0.8%  0.8%  -0.1%  0.1%  1.0%  0.4%  0.4%  0.7% 
 
 
One could argue that the relevant criterion in deciding whether cooperation is 
sustainable is not whether individual countries find the economic cost to be too high 
relative to an alternative where there was never any international policy action in the first 
place, but rather whether individual countries find the cost to be too high relative to a 
strategy where they drop out but others continue to cooperate (i.e. a game theoretic 
viewpoint).  
We are not claiming to prove any theorems regarding sub-game perfect 
cooperative equilibria.  But the spirit is that the international regime imposes moderate 
penalties for a country that does not participate, such as international opprobrium or trade 
penalties against imports of carbon-intensive products, and that these penalties are in the 
range of the thresholds X and Y (which we have been taking as 5% and 1% of income, 
respectively).   Under these assumptions, if the economic gain from dropping out 
measured by the Nash criterion is below the threshold, then cooperation would seem to 
be sustainable.  Only if cooperation in future periods is seen to be sustainable ex ante will   46 
the agreement be credible from the beginning.  Only if the agreement is credible will 
firms begin early to phase in new and existing low-carbon technologies, in anticipation of 
higher carbon costs in the future.  Only if firms begin to phase in these technologies from 
the beginning will an emissions target path that begins slowly succeed in its motivation of 
reducing costs by allowing sufficient time for the capital stock to turn over.  
Table 4b estimates costs by the Nash criterion.   The question is how much does it 
cost the country in question – considering each country one at a time – to participate if 
the alternative is the case where it drops out of the international agreement but the other 
countries continue to abide by it.  One might expect that the prospect of free riding would 
entail substantial gains for the country dropping out, i.e., that continued participation 
would entail substantial costs.  This is the essence of leakage.   Indeed the costs are 
higher in Table 4b than Table 4a for most of the countries, including most of the 
industrialized countries.    But for the former members of the Soviet Bloc (TE) and 
especially for the MENA countries, the economic cost is much lower in Table 4b than in 
Table 4a.   The explanation is that, regardless what they themselves do, oil producers bear 
substantial losses when participating countries reduce their demand for fossil fuels.  [In 
this sense, their cooperation is not really required.]    
The effect of switching to the Nash criterion is to narrow the range of costs across 
regions, so that it runs only from 0.7 per cent of income for India to 0.8 per cent for 
MENA, TE and one per cent for China.  This is very important.  The importance does not 
stem primarily from equity considerations.  If equity were the driving criterion then the 
benchmark would be not just a world in which no climate change policy is undertaken, 
but a world in which none is needed because there haven‘t been any greenhouse gas   47 
emissions in the first place.
20   The importance stems, rather, from the game theory 
considerations: any country that bears especially high costs for continuing to participate 
is likely to drop out. But the high-cost countries are the same as those that lose rather than 
gain from free riding on the coalition.    In Table 4b, the costs borne by the three highest 
country/regions – MENA, TE, and China – are in each case below 1 per cent of GDP, the 
Y=1 % threshold for every region. 
 
The economic losses in Figures 8a and 8b were measured according to the Nash 
criterion as well.  That is, the bar charts show the costs to each country, considered one at 
a time, to staying in the agreement, relative to a strategy of dropping out under the 
assumption that others continue to abide by the agreement.   As already noted, every 
country in every period shows an economic cost from participating that is less than 5 
percent.  Thus we have succeeded in meeting the X = 5% threshold.    Figure 9 
summarizes the economic costs of participation for each country or region, under the 
Nash criterion.  For each, the first bar shows the present discounted value.  For all 12 
regions the cost is below 1 per cent.  To recall a lesson of Figure 2b, the regime could 
probably survive the defection of MENA (and also TE), but it is much less likely that it 
could survive the defection of China.   For each region the second bar shows the 
economic loss in whatever period that loss is highest.  TE is the highest, almost reaching 
the threshold value of 5 per cent of income.  Next come China and Korea-South Africa-
Australia.  The finding that costs are able to stay under the thresholds is gratifying. 
 
                                                 
20 Viewed from this perspective, places such as India and Africa could sue countries such Saudi 
Arabia and the United States for the damage that their cumulative past emissions are inflicting on 
climate-sensitive tropical regions.   48 
Figure 9: Economic losses for each country, by the Nash criterion,  
compared to X and Y thresholds  
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Environmental effects 
Under the emission numbers considered here, the concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere is projected to reach 500 ppm in the late years of the century.   Figure 10 
shows the path of concentrations. Figure 11 shows the path of temperature, which in 2100 
attains a level that is 3 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as compared to 4 
degrees under business as usual.    
 
 
   49 
Figure 10: Path of concentrations under the 500 ppm CO2 goal 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
5
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
5
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
5
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
5
2
0
5
0
2
0
5
5
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
5
2
0
7
0
2
0
7
5
2
0
8
0
2
0
8
5
2
0
9
0
2
0
9
5
2
1
0
0
C
O
2
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
p
p
m
)
BaU
Proposed Architecture
 
 
Figure 11: Rise in temperature under the 500 ppm CO2 concentrations goal 
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7.  Seeking more ambitious concentration targets:  450 ppm or better  
  The concentrations goal that is attained by the emissions path specified above, 
500 ppm CO2, is nowhere near sufficient to accomplish the environmental goals that 
leaders seek.   As we have seen, it is estimated to reduce average temperature from a 4 
degree increase above pre-industrial levels to 3 degrees.   But leaders have supposedly 
agreed to a target of 2 degrees.   We conclude the study by reporting on our most recent 
explorations of more ambitious environmental goals. 
  Several of the countries reported more than one possible emissions target under 
the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements, in some cases conditioned on what 
other countries did, as Table 1 reports.   The EU, for example, has since 2009 said that it 
was prepared to achieve a target of emissions 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 if 
there were no comprehensive international agreement, but 30 per cent below if there was 
such an agreement.   Accordingly we adopt the more aggressive national targets as the 
starting point for this exercise.  Table 5 in Appendix 1 reports these targets for 2020 and 
2050, aggregated into the 12 regions that we need for our model.  The target here is on all 
emissions now, including land use emissions and other gasses. We include abatement 
options in other gasses and avoided deforestation (though not afforestation), consistent 
with the REDD initiative. As in the previous experiment, the data in the following also 
include bioenergy with CCS, unless otherwise specified.   Other modifications in order to 
move the targets in a more ambitious direction are reported in Table 5 in Appendix 1.  
  Figure 12 illustrates the global GHG emissions targets that result from the more 
ambitious parameter choices.   (It and the other graphs described in this section appear in   51 
Appendix 1.)   Emissions of all gases aggregated together do not achieve the Bali 
objective of halving by 2050 (unless one is measuring relative to BAU).  But they do fall 
to 20 Gt by the end of the century, which is less than half the 2010 level and one fifth the 
BAU level.   
Next, Figure 13 shows the targets for OECD countries.  The path of the assigned 
amounts is not very different from the less ambitious case.  Either way, they decline 
sharply from 2020 to 2050.  The big difference is that actual emissions are substantially 
lower: by 2035 aggregate emissions have declined below 10 Gt, whereas in Figure 3 
emissions (of CO2) had barely begun to decline at all.  This is because the rich countries 
now find it far more difficult to buy permits as easily, because the poor countries have 
fewer to sell.   Figure 14 shows the more ambitious targets for developing countries.  
Assigned amounts now peak as early as 2025.  Actual emissions begin to decline from 
the beginning, as the poor countries sell permits to the rich.  But the graph confirms that 
permit sales are quite small, because assigned amounts are pushed below 30 Gt as early 
as 2030, so that there are indeed few extra permits to spare. 
  The bars in Figure 15 show per capita emissions by each region in each period 
under the more aggressive targets.  Some high emitters like the United States and 
Australia show targets that are already by 2015 about 1 ton lower per capita than in the 
450ppm case.  China peaks at 2 tons per capita in 2020 and India never gets much above 
½ ton.  Convergence toward a common low target toward the end of the century is 
smoother than before. 
  Turning to the economic effects of these targets, Figure 16a shows the shadow 
price of a ton of CO2 rising almost to $500 a ton and the price of a gallon of gas rising   52 
almost to $4.5 a gallon, respectively – twice as high as when the environmental goal was 
less ambitious (Figure 6).   
Figure 16b illustrates the aggregate global costs.   The present discounted value 
now stands at about 2 per cent of income: 1.6% if BECCS is allowed and 2.1% if it is not. 
  Table 6 reports the present discounted value of economic costs for each region 
where the alternative of dropping out is defined by the BAU criterion.  Economic costs 
are higher for everyone -- three times the costs of the 450ppm goal in the case of TE, 
Latin America, and China.   
Figure 17 summarizes the economic costs of participation for each country or 
region measured with respect to the no policy baseline.  For each, the first bar shows the 
present discounted value and the second bar shows the economic loss in whatever period 
that loss is highest.  That costs are very high for the oil producing countries is perhaps not 
ultimately fatal, because we have argued that the regime could probably survive their 
non-participation.   It may be more worrisome that costs for the big three -- the US, China 
and India – are above the threshold at least in terms of present discounted value (1%) 
and, for China, also above the threshold of the highest cost in any single year (5%).    
 
One way to give perspective to the estimated costs of climate change mitigation is 
to express them in terms of delay to economic growth.  To attain the environmental goal 
of 500 ppm, global income at the end of the century is two years behind what it would be 
under BAU.  To attain 440 ppm, income in 2100 is four years behind.    
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The environmental consequences of the more aggressive emissions path are also 
shown in Appendix 1.   Figure 18b continues to report concentrations in terms of carbon 
dioxide alone, for purposes of comparison with the preceding results.  Concentrations 
toward the end of the century level off below 450ppm of CO2, as compared to 500 ppm 
and rising in the less aggressive case, or shooting through 700 ppm under BAU.   Now 
that we are including other modes of mitigation, Figure 18a reports concentrations in 
terms of all greenhouse gases.   Mitigation is seen to cut total emissions by almost half 
(from a BAU level that measures almost 1000 ppm in GHGs).    Finally, Figure 19 
reports the effect on temperature, which is now substantial:   the rise above pre-industrial 
levels is only 2.3 degrees Celsius, as opposed to about 3 in the less aggressive case or 4 in 
BAU (or as compared to about 1 degree so far, as of 2011). 
 
8. Concluding perspective 
 
Section 7 put the estimated global cost of attaining an environmental outcome 
corresponding to 2.3 degrees centigrade of global warming at about 2 per cent of income 
under  our  formulas  approach.  One  might  wonder  whether  these  estimated  costs  of 
mitigation are justified by estimates of the avoided costs of environmental damage. 
Some economists attempt full cost-benefit analysis, to weigh economic costs of 
climate change mitigation against estimates of the monetized benefits of climate change 
mitigation,  by  means  of  integrated  assessment  models.  Typical  estimates  of  the 
monetized costs of a concentrations path corresponding to a 4 degree increase in year-
2100 temperature (the BAU estimate), as compared to limiting the warming to 2 degrees,   54 
are between 1 and 4 per cent of aggregate global income.
21 This range, wide as it is, by 
no means spans the range of estimates by reputable economists.
22  Furthermore, many 
impacts that might be associated with climate change have not yet been estimated.  The 
debate on how to evaluate the impact of extreme events is wide open.  Thus the 
mitigation scenarios studied here could be either far too mild or far too aggressive. The 
wide range of the damage estimates is one reason why we prefer to leave it to society to 
make the tradeoff between economic cost and environmental damage and do not attempt 
to do so ourselves.   Our focus is, rather, on how to design a framework under which 
cooperation is as sustainable as possible, for any given level of environmental ambition. 
Some readers, especially those not familiar with the economic models of climate 
change policy, may be surprised at the high estimated economic costs for hitting what 
seem like moderate environmental goals.   They can rest assured that the cost estimates of 
the  WITCH  model  allow  for  dynamic  technology  effects  (hence  ―Induced  Technical 
Change‖ in the name) and tend to lie in the middle of the pack of leading economic 
models (for example the 11 models compared in Clarke, et al, 2009).
23   
                                                 
21 At the lower end of this range, the 1% of income estimate comes from Tol (2002a,b).  
He estimates the costs (monetized damages) of 4 degrees of global warming at 
approximately 1 % of income if national costs are aggregated directly and 1 ½  % if they 
are aggregated by population under an equity argument, as compared to costs of 2 
degrees warming equal to 0 or ½ % of income, respectively.   (See also Tol, 2005.)   At 
the higher end of this range, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimate the costs of 4 degrees 
of global warming at approximately 4 % of income if national damages are aggregated 
directly and 5 % if they are aggregated by population, as compared to costs of 2 degrees 
at about 1 % of income aggregated by either method.   (See also Nordhaus, 1994, 2008.)   
22 Mendelsohn et al (1998) estimate much lower damages from global warming, as they 
concentrate on agricultural impacts where adaptation would play a key role.  Stern (2007, 
2011) estimates much higher damages, attributable, in particular, to the assumption of a 
low discount rate which gives weight to estimated damages very far into the future 
23 Tavoni and Tol (2010) argue that the standard models may underestimate the economic 
costs of attaining the target of 2 degrees C.   55 
But of course nobody can be sure that the estimates in these models are correct.   
Uncertainty  regarding  economic  costs  of  mitigation  is  probably  not  as  large  as 
uncertainty  regarding  the  avoided  costs  of  environmental  damages.    Nevertheless, 
economic costs may turn out to be either higher or lower than estimated in our model.   In 
future  research  we  plan  to  explore  the  implications  of  uncertainty  in  technology, 
economic growth, and the environment.     A central  attraction of putting the formula 
approach into effect would be that the parameters could readily be adjusted in future 
budget periods, as more information becomes available.  If technological innovations 
occur that reduce the cost of hitting any given environmental goal, parameters and targets 
can then be changed accordingly.  The success of the international climate regime is 
much less sensitive to the designer‘s initial guess as to the appropriate endpoint than it is 
to  whether  the  designer  takes  care  not  to  impose  unreasonable  costs  on  any  critical 
country, so that the agreement is comprehensive and credible. 
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